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A MEDIEVAL BOOK AND EARLY-MODERN LAW:  
BRACTON'S AUTHORITY AND APPLICATION IN THE COMMON LAW 
c.1550-1640  
Ian Williams*,  
 
The thirteenth-century book known as Bracton was first printed in 1569, fifteen years 
after Glanvill and three decades after Britton1. Despite its relatively late arrival into the list 
of printed common law books, of all the older common-law books it is Bracton which has 
tended to occupy the interest of historians. In no small part, this is due to Edward Coke’s 
later use of Bracton in disputes with James I2. However, much less interest is shown in 
Bracton’s use in early-modern England more generally, certainly compared to Bracton’s use 
as a source for thirteenth century law3. This article seeks to correct that imbalance by 
showing that Bracton was an important source for some early-modern common lawyers, 
particularly in certain fields. There were a number of impediments to the use of Bracton in 
the early-modern common law which may have inhibited its reception. The most recent 
work has suggested that Bracton’s popularity in early-modern England stemmed from 
Coke’s popularisation of the book by his references to it in his Reports4. In fact, some of 
the impediments to Bracton’s use were overcome, or overlooked, in the sixteenth and 
early-seventeenth centuries. Bracton came to have an assured place in the common-law 
canon even before Coke’s use of the text, although it never became a standard reference 
work.  
                                                 
* Lecturer, University College London; Faculty of  Laws, Bentham House, Endsleigh Gardens, London 
WC1H 0EG, UK; i.s.williams@ucl.ac.uk.  
 Elements of  this article have been presented at the Cambridge Legal History Colloquium, Oxford Legal 
History Forum and London Legal History Seminar. My thanks to the organisers and all participants for 
their helpful comments and to Mr Henry Mares and Professor Andrew Lewis for comments on earlier 
drafts. My thanks to all those who assisted by consulting volumes for annotations or arranging access to 
material. Particular thanks to Ms Laura Anne Bedard, Special Collections Librarian of  the Edward Bennett 
Williams Law Library, Georgetown University, who put considerable effort into facilitating my visit to 
consult Coke’s Bracton. This research was undertaken with support from the F.W. Maitland Memorial Fund. 
Original spelling has been retained in all quotations.  
1 Glanvill, Tractatus de legibus et consuetudinibus regni Anglie, London 1554 and Britton, London undated (but 
printed by Robert Redman). Redman died in 1540, indicating that Britton must have been printed before 
then. Early-modern readers considered Henry de Bratton to be the author of  the eponymous book and 
this fact was sometimes of  significance in discussing its place in legal argument (see infra, nn. 88-92 and 
text). His authorship is now in dispute (for a recent contribution and references to other views, see J.L. 
Barton, The Authorship of  Bracton: Again, Journal of  Legal History, 30 (2009), p. 117-174).  
2 See R.G. Usher, James I and Sir Edward Coke, English Historical Review, 18 (1903), p. 664-675.  
3 Only one article has been written about the later use of  Bracton (D.E.C. Yale, “Of  No Mean Authority”: 
Some Later Uses of  Bracton, in: On the Laws and Customs of  England: essays in honor of  Samuel E. 
Thorne, ed. by M.S. Arnold, et al., Chapel Hill 1981, p. 383-396), compared to the many articles on Bracton 
in medieval law (for a non-exhaustive list, see, e.g., J. Getzler, A History of  Water Rights at Common Law, 
Oxford 2004, p. 50 n.13).  
4 Yale, “Of  No Mean Authority” (supra, n. 3), p. 387-388.  
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 This article will consider the impediments to the use of Bracton, the printing of 
the first edition, the text’s place in the early-modern common-law canon and some topics 
in Bracton which seem to have been of particular interest for common lawyers before the 
reprinting of the book in 1640.5 A wide range of evidence will be used, including all of 
the surviving copies of that edition available in publicly accessible libraries in Britain6. 
This use of the surviving copies and particularly the annotations found within them is to 
apply one of the standard methods of the history of reading to legal history7. In the 
history of reading, annotations are typically used in two ways 8 : the first is to use 
annotations and other information to glean further insights into existing historical 
questions; the second is to use the available evidence to try and understand how texts 
were read in the past. This article demonstrates that these two different concerns are 
interrelated; the practice of, and the assumptions behind, standard early-modern reading 
techniques ensured and secured Bracton’s place in the common-law canon.  
 For early-modern historians, understanding how texts were read in the past is an 
important concern. An awareness that texts are susceptible to multiple different readings 
is not an innovation of post-modernist historians, but was a central element in some 
early-modern debates, most obviously in the theological sphere. For example, the 
English divine Richard Hooker thought that puritans believed that ‘the word of God 
runs currently on [their] side’ because ‘their minds are forestalled and their conceits 
                                                 
5 Bracton, Henrici de Bracton de legibus et consuetudinibus angliae, London 1640. This second printing survives in 
greater numbers than the first printing. After 1640, Bracton’s place in the common-law canon seems to have 
been assured. Furthermore, Bracton came to be of  importance in a wide range of  contexts, including the 
constitutional debates of  the 1640s. Bracton was used by Edward Coke in matters of  political controversy 
(supra, n.2), but became more important during the reign of  Charles I, even being cited at the trial of  the 
king (see Yale, “Of  No Mean Authority” (supra, n. 3), p. 391) as the idea of  the ‘ancient constitution’ became 
ever more important. It seems plausible that the 1640 printing of  Bracton was a response to the text’s 
political role. Certainly law books could be printed for that pupose: when Glanvill was reprinted in 1604, it 
was made clear that this was as a contribution to the controversial debate on Anglo-Scottish legal 
unification (see Glanville, Tractatus de legibus & consuetudinibus regni Angliae, London 1604, titlepage and 
sig.*iiiv).   
6 Meaning the British Library, university and college libraries and the libraries of  the Inns of  Court.  
7 For an accessible recent introduction to the history of  reading see H.J. Jackson, Marginalia: Readers Writing 
in Books, New Haven 2001. The use of  history of  reading approaches for English legal historians is not 
unprecedented. Like Moliere’s unwitting speaker of  prose, Knafla’s study of  Thomas Egerton’s writings 
and books is an exercise in what would now be considered the history of  reading, but never describes itself  
to be such (L.A. Knafla, The Law Studies of  an Elizabethan Student, Huntington Library Quarterly, 32 (1969), 
p. 221-240 and L.A. Knafla, Law and Politics in Jacobean England, the tracts of  Lord Chancellor Ellesmere, 
Cambridge 1977). Osler’s examination of  the dispersal of  law books throughout Europe is another 
method which is now claimed to be part of  the history of  reading (D.J. Osler, The Fantasy Men, 
Rechtsgeschichte, 10 (2007), p. 181-185). Certain strands in European legal historiography relate to issues 
in the history of  reading. Most obviously, the legal humanist change from ahistorical to historical 
interpretation of  the Corpus Iuris Civilis is a change in the assumptions underlying the reading of  the 
Roman texts.  
8 See A. Grafton, Is the History of  Reading a Marginal Enterprise?, Papers of  the Bibliographical Society of  
Amercia,  91 (1997), p. 141-142.  
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perverted beforehand’ through the teaching of their preachers in explaining the meaning 
of particular words9. The (erroneous) way in which puritans read and interpreted their 
texts necessarily led to their (erroneous) conclusions. Without such teaching, Hooker 
thought that an unprejudiced reading of the Bible would lead to the scriptural 
underpinnings of the puritan arguments falling away, enabling reconciliation. For legal 
historians, it is just such a concern which underlay the arguments against the printing of 
legal material in English. As Ferdinando Pulton observed, the concern was that laws, like 
the Scriptures, might be subject to ‘depraving, misconstruing, or wresting of the laws of 
God, or man, out of their true meaning, & proper sense’, and countered that the actions 
of ignorant people do not ‘impeach the credit of the same laws’10. This article will use 
reader annotations to show how common lawyers construed (and arguably misconstrued) 
Bracton centuries after the book was written.  
 There are twenty five surviving annotated copies in Britain; a further two 
annotated copies from the United States have also been consulted11. These annotations 
provide much of the source material for this article. There are a further seven 
unannotated copies which have been identified in Britain12. One of the difficulties in 
assessing the place of Bracton in early-modern law has been that references to Bracton were 
always exceptional in legal argument. The evidence from the annotated copies provides a 
valuable supplement to the more traditional legal history sources of law reports and legal 
literature.   
 
IMPEDIMENTS TO THE USE OF BRACTON 
                                                 
9 Richard Hooker, Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie, Preface.3.9 in: The Folger Library Edition of the 
Works of Richard Hooker, ed. by W. Speed Hill, 7 vols., Cambridge MA 1977, vol.1, p. 16-17.  
10  Ferdinando Pulton, De Pace Regis et Regni, London 1609, sig.Av. For the arguments against printing 
English law, particularly in English, see R.J. Ross, The Commoning of  the Common Law: The Renaissance Debate 
over Printing English Law, 1520-1640, University of  Pennsylvania Law Review, 146 (1998), p. 323-461.  
11 For the annotated copies, see the table of copies in the Appendix. Copies of Bracton have been given a 
code included in the table, and all references will be to title and then the individual codes (for example, 
Bracton AL fo.192 is a reference to fo.192 of the copy of Bracton now in the Advocates’ Library). Where a 
reference is to Bracton generally, no library code is given and references are simply to the 1569 printing. 
Many annotations are underlinings which cannot be dated reliably. Underlinings have therefore generally 
been ignored as evidence unless they can be associated with other evidence providing an indication of their 
date. The two American copies are Bracton GUL and Bracton HEH, both of which were consulted before 
this project took shape. There are doubtless further annotated copies in North America. Copies of the 
1569 printing are also held by the Max Planck Institut für Rechtsgeschichte in Frankfurt, the Bibliothèque 
Nationale de France in Paris and the Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale Vittorio Emanuele II in Rome. These 
European copies have not been consulted.  
12 What proportion of  the printing survives is unclear. See infra, n. 42. The evidence of  reading has been 
combined with evidence from other sources in an attempt to produce a well-rounded understanding of  the 
reading of  Bracton.  
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As Yale notes, Fitzherbert’s Graunde Abridgement included a statement that Bracton was not 
an author in ‘our law’. Yale argues that this stopped the use of Bracton in legal argument 
for much of the sixteenth century, until Coke’s popularisation at the end of it 13 . 
Fitzherbert’s books (both the Natura Brevium and his Abridgement) were widely-read and 
well-respected14, and it is legitimate to infer that this rejection of Bracton was likely to have 
signficant consequences, although there is evidence that Fitzherbert’s remarks did not 
have a strong exclusionary effect15.  
 In addition to this objection, other considerations may have restricted the use of 
Bracton. The 1569 printed edition runs to over 900 printed pages. Such a large volume 
must have been extremely expensive if obtained in manuscript and would have been too 
large for lawyers to copy themselves. In print, Bracton was an unusually large and well-
crafted common-law book, described by Plucknett as ‘a stately volume, perhaps the best 
printed law book we have ever had’16. However, such features would have made the 
work expensive. There is little evidence for the price of Bracton, but one copy shows that 
Henry Boughton (admitted to the Inner Temple in 160617) purchased his copy for fifteen 
shillings 18 . It seems likely that the purchase was in the first few decades of the 
seventeenth century, making it more or less contemporary to a list of law book prices 
available in manuscript. According to that list (probably from the period 1615-1628) this 
would make Bracton more expensive than all but a few other law books at that time19. 
This list may also indicate that Bracton was not widely available, even second-hand, in the 
seventeenth century. While Bracton is included in the list of books to be acquired, it has 
no price, suggesting that the compiler could not establish a market price20. Unlike the 
                                                 
13 Yale, “Of  No Mean Authority” (supra, n. 3), p. 383-8, citing Anthony Fitzherbert, La Graunde Abridgement, 
London 1516, fo.clix, tit.Gard., pl.71.  
14 In Penyngton v Hunte (1544) in: Reports of  Cases in the Time of  Henry VIII, ed. by J.H. Baker, [Selden 
Society vol. 121], 2 vols., London 2004, vol.II, p. 458, Bradshaw SG cited Fitzherbert’s views in court, with 
the justification that Fitzherbert was a ‘learned and discreet man’ and in Andrewes v Lord Cromwell ((1602) 
British Library (BL) MS Additional 25203, fos.508 and 509) both Yelverton and Popham made it clear that 
they relied upon Fitzherbert because of  his personal characteristics leading to a presumption of  accuracy.  
15 See infra, nn. 68-74 and text.  
16 T.F.T. Plucknett, Concise History of  the Common Law, 5th ed., Boston MA 1956, p. 263. Such considerations 
may explain the use of  Bracton as a gift. Thomas Egerton received his copy of  Bracton as a gift from 
Thomas Owen, sometime justice of  the Common Pleas (Bracton HEH, titlepage) and William Ravenscroft 
donated a copy to Lincoln's Inn library (Bracton LIL1, titlepage).   
17 See infra, n. 45 and text.   
18 Bracton ASC, titlepage.  
19 BL MS Harleian 160 (The Price of the law in quiers or as it is to be bought at the second hand which may direct allsoe 
what to give for new bookes unless the scarcitye of some booke doe alter the price), fo.233. Only three books were given 
prices more expensive than fifteen shillings: Thomas Ashe, Epieikeia et table generall a les annales del ley, 
London 1609, cost £1 6s 8d; and two books of entries by John Rastall were recording as costing £1 10s 
(for an ‘old one’) and £1 6s 8d (for that ‘last printed’).  
20 The compiler did not include prices for other old works (such as Britton and Statham’s Abridgment), but 
the absence of  prices for some collections of  statutes and the standard abridgments of  Fitzherbert and 
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yearbooks, early-modern printed reports or Littleton’s Tenures, Bracton was clearly not an 
essential common-law work, explaining why the book was not reprinted until 1640.  
 Bracton’s non-essential status is corroborated by evidence from lawyers’ use of the 
text. John Dodderidge is unusual in including references to Bracton in his student and 
early-career commonplace book21. Other lawyers seem to have consulted Bracton only late 
in their careers. Edward Coke only incorporated references to Bracton into his 
commonplace book at some point between 1585 and 1592, despite having been called to 
the bar in 157822. John Savile only acquired his copy of Bracton in 1590, four years before 
he became a serjeant23 and Thomas Egerton does not seem to have used Bracton until 
around 1600, when he was already Lord Keeper24.  
 Students may have avoided Bracton not simply for economic reasons. The length 
of Bracton may have discouraged casual use. It is unusual to see annotations through the 
entire printed volume25. One of the unusual readers who did read the whole book, John 
Savile, ended his reading with a simple, but one imagines heartfelt, ‘laus deo’ 26 ! 
Furthermore, there was active discouragement from using Bracton. Lawyers recognised 
that Bracton was not always an accurate guide to the law. Thomas Norton spent much of 
his editor’s preface to the printed edition explaining why Bracton was still fit to be read, 
despite the book having been written in a time of religious ignorance27, while other 
lawyers warned about the fact of legal change. Coke’s report of Paine’s Case makes it clear 
that Bracton was not to be used where it may ‘impugn the common experience and 
                                                                                                                                            
Brooke is more surprising.  
21 BL MS Hargrave 407, e.g. fos.74v, 95v, 111v, 242v, 375. Dodderidge’s commonplace is exceptional in 
other ways, such as mixing civilian and common law material (see infra, n. 120 and text), suggesting 
Dodderidge was an atypical student.  
22  I. Williams, The Tudor Genesis of  Edward Coke's Immemorial Common Law, Sixteenth Century Journal, 
forthcoming, n. 69-70 and text.  
23 Bracton TCC, titlepage.  
24 Thomas Egerton’s surviving papers and copy of  Bracton (Bracton HEH) provide no evidence for reading 
before around 1600, but good evidence for reading after that date (see infra, n. 107). Egerton received his 
copy as a gift from Thomas Owen (supra, n. 16), who died in 1598. However, Owen did not make any 
bequests to Egerton in his will, so the gift must have been inter vivos and we therefore cannot assume that 
Egerton did not receive his copy until almost 1600. My thanks to Professor David Ibbetson for supplying 
this information.  
25  Grafton, Is the History of  Reading (supra, n. 8), p. 153 considers this to be typical of  early-modern 
annotators generally. However, for common lawyers it seems that rather than ‘tailing off ’, readers were 
instead selective. See infra, nn. 93-125 and text.  
26  Bracton TCC1, fo. 444v.  
27 Bracton, sig. 1¶ii. Norton’s role as editor is not stated in the printed text, which identifies the editor only 
as ‘T.N.’ (Bracton, sig. 1¶ii). Yale suspected Norton’s role, but could not prove it (Yale, “Of  No Mean 
Authority” (supra, n. 3), p. 386 n. 16). William Lambarde expands the initials in his copy of  Bracton to 
‘Thomas Norton’, providing the only evidence that Norton was, or was at least reputed to be, the editor of  
Bracton. Lambarde received his copy of  Bracton as a gift from the printer, so he appears well-placed to 
identify the editor (Bracton SUL, titlepage).  
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allowance in judicial proceedings at this day’28, and, perhaps more importantly, William 
Fulbeck’s Direction to prospective law students linked Bracton with Glanvill and Britton as 
books upon which it was ‘dangerous’ to rely because ‘most of that which they do give 
forth for law, is now antiquated, and abolished’29. These warnings were not unheeded; 
readers of Bracton can be seen marking where the law had changed30. However, such an 
approach was only available to more experienced lawyers - for students such warnings 
must have had some deterrent effect.  
 Such difficulties led Knafla to suggest that Bracton was not of interest of common 
lawyers concerned about contemporary law in the sixteenth century, but rather to 
historically-minded individuals (lawyers or otherwise) interested in thirteenth century 
law31. The ownership of a copy of Bracton by Archbishop Matthew Parker would support 
this view32, as do many of the annotations in William Lambarde’s copy of Bracton33. 
However, Lambarde’s copy also contains annotations which suggest a concern with more 
contemporary problems 34 . As will become apparent, in this Lambarde was not 
unrepresentative. 
  
THE 1569 PRINTING OF BRACTON 
Despite the problems with using the text, the editor to the first printed edition stressed 
the long-standing demand for the book to be printed 35 . We should certainly expect 
Richard Tottell, the law-printer, to base his decision on commercial self-interest. Tottell’s 
output seems to have been printed in cycles. The monopoly over common-law printing 
gave Tottell unique access to a relatively stable (but slowly growing) market36. Figure 1 
                                                 
28 Paine’s Case (1587) 8 Co.Rep. 34, at p. 34v-35. Such views are not typical of  Coke, but it seems likely that 
the report was not originally Coke’s own. Coke provides a plea roll reference for the date of  the case, not 
the date of  decision. As Baker observes generally, a simple plea roll reference indicates that Coke reported 
a case second hand (J.H. Baker, Coke’s Note-Books and the Sources of  his Reports, Cambridge Law Journal, 30 
(1972), p. 68). That seems to be the case here: the case is included in the manuscript of  Coke’s Reports 
under Michaelmas term 1609 (Cambridge University Library (CUL) MS Ii.5.21, fo.77v), indicating that 
either the case took an extremely long time to be resolved or (more likely) that Coke was repeating 
another’s report.  
29 William Fulbeck, A Direction or Preparative to the study of  the Lawe, London 1600, fo. 27.  
30 E.g. Bracton THL, fos. 28v and 63; KCL fo. 12v and SLL fo. 139. An anoymous reader in one of  the Inns 
of  Court in the time of  Henry VIII made the same point (J.H. Baker, Oxford History of  the Laws of  England, 
vol.VI, 1483-1558, Oxford 2003, p. 23 n.89, citing BL MS Harg. 87, fo. 374).  
31 Knafla, Law Studies (supra, n. 7), 232.   
32 Bracton CCL. Parker did not annotate his copy.  
33 Bracton SUL, fos. 86 and 128v (annotations in Anglo-Saxon). For Edward Coke's use of  Bracton as a 
historical source, see Williams, The Tudor Genesis (supra, n. 22), n. 66-106 and text.  
34 See infra, n. 94.   
35 Bracton, sig. 1qii.  
36 For the increasing size of  the legal profession in early-modern England, see Christopher Brooks, Lawyers, 
Litigation and English Society since 1450, London 1998, p. 182.  
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shows Tottell’s output over his career 37 . Evidently there are pronounced peaks and 
troughs. The peaks are periods in which Tottell reprinted large numbers of yearbooks, 
which were typically rather short, as individual works. Tottell seems to have built up 
stock which he gradually dissipated over a period of around seven to ten years38. In fact, 
Tottell developed a practice of mixing pages from old printings with more recent ones, 
so he actually built up a stock of pages, rather than books39. However, while stock was 
dissipated Tottell would need to use his equipment and workers. During the low-points 
of production Tottell therefore produced what have been termed ‘extraordinary 
publications’: law-books which were not part of Tottell’s established stock. This category 
includes Glanville and Bracton, but also works such as Staunford’s Plees del Coron 40 . 
Staunford’s Prerogative del Roy suggests that these books may have had small initial print 
runs; that work was printed in 1567 but Tottell needed to reprint in 156841. From the 
cyclical nature of Tottel's output, the production of Bracton may therefore have been a 
commercial gamble, something to keep his presses and workers busy while existing stock 
was dissipated. However, other evidence suggests that while Bracton was used to fill a gap 
in Tottel's production schedule, Tottel did not consider the production of Bracton a 
gamble.  
 Although it is unclear how many copies of Bracton were produced42, Bracton seems 
to have taken almost all of Tottell’s energy in 1569. Tottell printed relatively few other 
law books in that year, and his other principal output in 1569 was Richard Grafton’s 
Chronicle at Large, a work of over 1400 pages. In fact, Tottell had to appoint another 
printer, Henry Denham, to print Grafton’s Chronicle, despite the fact that Grafton was 
                                                 
37 The chart amalgamates Tottell’s legal and non-legal output. Non-legal printing is not a large proportion 
of  Tottell's total output, but as a non-legal text is relevant for the discussion that follows, it is appropriate 
to include non-legal material in the figures.  
38 Presumably it is not a coincidence that seven years was around the normal duration of  a practicing 
lawyer's education at the Inns of  Court. Tottell's most productive period was 1553-1558, the period in 
which he first received his patent and could not have been sure that it would outlive Elizabeth’s two 
predecessors. Once Elizabeth confirmed Tottell’s patent his position must have seemed more secure and 
his rate of  production slowed.  
39 J.H. Baker, English Law Books and Legal Publishing, in: The Cambridge History of  the Book in Britain: 
Volume IV, 1557-1695, ed. by J. Barnard and D.F. McKenzie, Cambridge 2002, p. 480. As Baker outlines, 
this practice makes it difficult to be certain quite when particular works were produced.  
40 Some books (Plowden, Commentaries; Staunford, Prerogative del Roy; Brooke, Graund Abridgement and Dyer, 
Ascun Novel Cases) are initially included in this category, but subsequent printings are classified as ‘ordinary 
publications’.  
41 The same may be true of  Brooke's Graund Abridgement, first printed in 1573 and reprinted in 1576. For 
that volume it is quite possible that Tottell was unsure whether Brooke would displace Fitzherbert as the 
abridgment of  choice. 
42 A typical early-modern printing was of  1000-1500 copies (D.R. Woolf, Reading History in Early-Modern 
England, Cambridge 2000, p. 207-208), but this seems an improbably large figure for a work of  Bracton’s size 
and for the relatively limited market of  common lawyers and learned readers interested in Bracton's subject 
matter.  
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Tottell’s father-in-law43! In 1569 it seems that Tottell made arrangements to keep his 
presses busy and then in fact discovered that they were too busy, leading to him send 
work elsewhere. Although Tottell could not have sent the printing of Bracton to another 
(as he had the monopoly printing right), Tottell could have chosen to delay the printing 
of Bracton until after Grafton's Chronicle had been completed. The fact that Tottell did not 
suggests a belief that printing Bracton may have been the more profitable of the two 
works, corroborating the claim in the editor’s preface about long-standing demand.  
 
READING BRACTON 
The majority of the annotated copies have no evidence identifying their early-modern 
owners. However, eleven copies do have identifiable owners. From those annotated 
copies of Bracton, the majority of owners (nine of eleven) were common lawyers. Copies 
can be identified which belonged to Edward Coke, Thomas Egerton (who received it 
from Thomas Owen, a justice of the Common Pleas) 44 , John Savile (Baron of the 
Exchequer), William Lambarde, Henry Boughton (admitted to the Inner Temple in 1606), 
Philip Stone (admitted to the Middle Temple in 1603), Edward Goldynge (admitted to 
Gray’s Inn in 1588) and Edmund Godfrey (admitted to Gray’s Inn in 1640)45. William 
Ravenscroft also donated a copy to Lincoln’s Inn Library46.  
 There were other owners and readers who were not common lawyers, but these 
represent a small portion of the surviving copies. There are no identified civilian owners47. 
Some civilians, such as Cowell, did read Bracton 48 , and a collection of early-modern 
                                                 
43 Richard Grafton, A chronicle at large and meere history of  the affayres of  Englande and kinges of  the same deduced 
from the Creation of  the worlde, London 1569, final page. Tottell had printed Grafton’s Abridgement of  the 
chronicles of  England from 1562 and continued to do so after 1569 (e.g. in 1572), but that is a much shorter 
work. For Tottell’s family ties to Grafton, see Anna Greening, Richard Tottell, in: The Oxford Dictionary of  
National Biography : from the earliest years to the year 2000, 61 vols., ed. by H.C.G. Matthew and Brian 
Harrison, Oxford 2004, vol. 55, p. 74.  
44 See supra, n. 16.  
45 Bracton GLL, HEH, SUL, ASC, DCC and BL3. All information about admission to the Inns has been 
taken from Foster’s manuscript alphabetical register of  admissions to the Inns of  Court (CUL MSs 
Additional 6694-6698).  
46 Bracton LIL1, titlepage. One wonders whether this was a replacement for the manuscript copy the library 
used to own, but which was lost (see Baker, Oxford History (supra, n. 30), p. 27).  
47 There are no copies of  Bracton listed in either the probate inventories of  scholars of  the University of  
Cambridge or more generally in catalogues of  private libraries of  the period. See E.S. Leedham-Green, 
Books in Cambridge Inventories: book-lists from Vice-Chancellor's Court probate inventories in the Tudor and Stuart 
periods, Cambridge 1986 and R.J. Fehrenbach, E.S. Leedham-Green and J.L. Black eds., Private Libraries in 
Renaissance England, Binghamton NY 1992-2009, 7 volumes. The only possible civilian whose inventory 
reveals possible ownership of  Bracton is Benedict Thorowgood (died 1596), who had a wide range of  
common-law works in his collection. Bracton is not mentioned, but his inventory included some 
unidentified common-law books to the value of  20 shillings (Leedham-Green, Books in Cambridge, pp. 531-
5). Given the cost of  a second-hand copy of  Bracton in the early-seventeenth century (see supra, n. 18 and 
text) , it is possible that Bracton was included in this group.  
48 John Cowell, Institutiones Iuris Anglicani, Cambridge 1605, has references to Bracton throughout.  
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material in the British Library refers to Bracton as evidence that the civil law was part of 
the study of English law in the reign of Henry III49. However, there is little evidence of 
such civilian readers from the surviving copies. Two copies of Bracton provide evidence 
of civilian knowledge mixed with common law annotations by Elizabethan and Jacobean 
readers. In each case, the common law and civilian annotations are in the same hands50. 
Other copies feature common-law and civilian material, but were clearly annotated by 
different people, and most civilian annotations cannot be clearly dated to the period 
before 1640.51 
 Non-lawyers are also known to have owned or read Bracton. Archbishop Parker 
owned a copy but does not seem to have annotated it. Another senior ecclesiastic, bishop 
Thomas Barlow, annotated his copy in the early-mid seventeenth century, after Bracton 
has entered into political discourse52. Finally, Richard Hooker read Bracton, excerpted 
quotes from it and even cited it in book VIII of his Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity53. Hooker’s 
use of Bracton in the realm of political theory therefore precedes Coke’s use of the same 
passage in his debates with James I54.  
                                                 
49  BL MS Stowe 423, fos. 37-37v. The collection is anonymous, but the subject matter focuses on 
ecclesiastical matters, seemingly from a civilian perspective.  
50 Bracton NUL, fos. 2 and 5v feature references to civilian material, fo.55 has a reference to the yearbooks 
in the same hand. Both civilian references seem to be to works attributed to Minsinger. The latter is a 
reference to Minsinger’s work on the Institutes, but the former seems to refer to a set of institutes on the 
‘iuris canonici’. Minsinger did not produce such a work, the reference may be to Joannes Paulus Lancellotus, 
Institutiones iuris canonici (Perusiae, first printed 1560 and widely reprinted). The content is similar to that in 
Lancellotus, but not identical. However, it is possible that the annotator was working from memory. My 
thanks to Professor Andrew Lewis for this suggestion. It seems that both these authors were well-known 
in late-sixteenth century England: for a common lawyer citing Minsinger’s work on the Institutes see 
Serjeant Williams’ argument in Zangis v Whiskard (1595) BL MS Additional 25211, fo. 124, at fo. 124v; 
Helmholz shows that even a proctor in the ecclesiastical courts could refer to Minsinger in 1595 (R.H. 
Helmholz, Oxford History of the Laws of England, vol.I: the canon law and ecclesiastical jurisdiction from 597 to the 
1640s, Oxford 2004, p. 292, see also p. 253 and p. 258 for other uses of Minsinger by English canon 
lawyers); Lancellotus was cited by Richard Hooker (in Hooker, Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie, (supra, 
n.9), V.58.3, vol.2, p. 250) and was cited by Henry Swinburne (J. Duncan M. Derrett, Henry Swinburne 
(?1551-1624) Civil Lawyer of York, [Borthwick Papers 44], York 1974, p. 41). Bracton BL2, fos. 16v and 27 
have references to the Decretals, fos. 75v and 86v show references to Littleton, seemingly in the same hand. 
However, references to other common-law ideas (such as on fo. 18) seem to be in a different hand. Bracton 
GUL, fo. 86v, features common-law annotations and a reference to the work of the civilian John Cowell. 
However, the reference is to a passage in Cowell’s Institutiones which itself refers to Bracton. The Institutiones 
were strongly civilian in tone, but purported to be a work about the common law, so this reference does 
not demonstrate links with the civil law. The same page of Bracton also features later civilian annotations of 
a later date.  
51 E.g., Bracton GUL, fo. 86v has civilian annotations written around earlier common-law annotations.  
52 For Parker, Bracton CCL. For Barlow, see Bracton QCL. My thanks to Ms Amanda Saville of  the Queen's 
College, Oxford, for this information.  
53 See A.S. McGrade, Constitutionalism Late Medieval and Early Modern – Lex Facit Regem: Hooker’s Use of  
Bracton in: Acta Conventus Neo-Latini Bononiensis: proceedings of  the fourth International Congress of  
Neo-Latin Studies, ed. by R.J. Schoeck, Binghamton NY 1985, p. 116-123.  
54 See supra, n. 2.  
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 Historians of reading have noted the tendency for early-modern readers to be 
‘pragmatic readers’ who read for a particular purpose, actively looking for material related 
to particular concerns55. The readers identified here were just such readers, reading for 
particular purposes. Barlow and Hooker seem to have read Bracton for possible utility in 
political discourse and Parker presumably owned Bracton due to his antiquarian interests. 
The common lawyers are similar - copies of Bracton were read, seemingly for use56. Not 
only were lawyers selective in their choice of sections to read 57 , but their reading 
technique both assumed and generated the possibility of using Bracton in early-modern 
legal argument.  
 The recommended technique for reading in early-modern Europe was through 
commonplacing and legal commonplacing was widespread in early-modern England58. 
Commonplacing was a universal Renaissance approach to the collection, retention and 
subsequent recollection of material by collecting ideas, quotes, and summaries under 
appropriate headings; it was a method which children were encouraged to develop in 
their schooldays and continued into adult life, used to provide a store of material for use 
when required59. Renaissance readers were encouraged to commonplace all texts they 
read. By so doing they divorced excerpted texts from their context, placing different texts 
in conjunction with one another on the assumption that all were equally suitable for use 
in argument. Common lawyers proceeded according to these expectations and many 
early-modern commonplace books survive, especially for the period 1590-164060.  
                                                 
55 The concept of  ‘pragmatic readers’ was introduced in L. Jardine and W.H. Sherman, Pragmatic readers 
readers: knowledge transactions and scholarly services in late Elizabethan England, in: Religion, culture and society in 
early modern Britain: essays in honour of  Patrick Collinson, ed. by A. Fletcher and P. Roberts, Cambridge 
1994, p. 115-116. The same idea is found, without this language, in L. Jardine and A. Grafton, “Studied for 
Action”: How Gabriel Harvey read his Livy, Past and Present, 129 (1990), p. 30-78.  
56 William Lambarde’s copy contains clear antiquarian annotations which, in Lambarde’s case, would also 
have been for his own specific purposes. However, see n.94 for evidence Lambarde also read Bracton with 
an eye to practical concerns.   
57 On which, see infra, nn. 93-125.  
58 For commonplacing and common lawyers, see R.J. Ross, The Memorial Culture of  Early modern English 
Lawyers: Memory as Keyword, Shelter and Identity, 1560-1640, Yale Journal of  Law and the Humanities, 10 
(1998), p. 280-282.  
59 On commonplacing, see A. Moss, Printed Commonplace-Books and the Structure of  Renaissance Thought, Oxford 
1996. K. Sharpe Reading Revolutions: the politics of  reading in early-modern England, New Haven 2000, is a good 
example of  the use of  commonplaces in historical research.  
60 Significant lawyers whose commonplace books survive include: Edward Coke (BL MS Harleian 6687, 
fos. 1-187); John Dodderidge (BL MS Harg. 407); and Thomas Egerton (Henry E. Huntington Library 
Manuscripts Ellesmere (HEH MS El.) 492, 494 and 496, probably an incomplete set). This study has made 
use of  these examples, and several others. Brooks has recently discussed the possible impact of  
commonplacing on the form of  legal discourse, but not on lawyers’ understanding of  the substantive law 
or on the acceptability of  sources for legal argument (C.W. Brooks, Law, Politics and Society in Early Modern 
England, Cambridge 2008, p. 66).  
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 It is therefore unsurprising that annotators marked Bracton in a manner that 
indicates an intention to incorporate material from Bracton into commonplace books. 
Marginal annotations showing traditional abridgement and commonplace titles were 
written next to the text, presumably so that the reader could place the material 
appropriately in their personal notes 61 . For example, in one copy of Bracton, the 
discussion of dos is commonplaced under the heading ‘dower’62. The following section is 
replete with references to abridgement material taken from the title ‘dower’63. For the 
reader of this copy, Bracton was integrated with the much later material, seemingly 
without difficulties. Crucially, commonplacing ensured Bracton’s place as a book in the 
common-law tradition. The act of commonplacing shows an acceptance of the idea that 
Bracton was capable of contemporary use. This method of reading therefore assumed, or 
contributed to, the entry of Bracton into the common-law canon.  
 Bracton's use was shaped by the act of commonplacing. As one recent writer has 
observed, commonplacing forces a text into preconceived categories 64 . By 
commonplacing Bracton, material that might not have been relevant to the early-modern 
common-law was made to become relevant. This combines with the fact that to 
commonplace the Latin material in Bracton, readers needed to place Bracton under law-
French headings. This meant that Bracton was translated and viewed through the prism of 
the pre-existing understanding that lawyers had of the law65, and ensured that Bracton was 
seen as having as much validity in legal matters as more recent material. Such an 
approach not only secured Bracton’s place in the common-law canon, but it could also 
lead to conceptual changes and misunderstandings66.  
 
                                                 
61 Examples include Bracton DCC, fos. 13, 16v, 104v, 188v and Bracton EUL1, fos. 1v-8v. The only reader of  
Bracton for whom both his complete commonplace book and his copy of  Bracton have been identified is 
Edward Coke. See Williams, The Tudor Genesis (supra, n. 22), n. 93 for evidence that Coke’s marginal notes in 
this style did lead to the material so annotated being incorporated into his commonplace book.  
62 Bracton GUL, fo. 304.  
63 Bracton GUL, fo. 305v.  
64 Sharpe, Reading Revolutions (supra, n. 59), p. 181. 
65 This is especially likely given the evidence that Bracton was not a book read by law students, but rather by 
more established practitioners. See supra, nn. 22-24 and text. As Chartier has noted, early-modern readers 
(and perhaps all readers) ‘read books with a previously gained knowledge that was easily evoked in the act 
of  reading…This “preknowledge”, as it were, was mobilized to produce comprehension of  what was read 
– a comprehension not necessarily in conformity with that desired by the producer of  the text or the 
maker of  the book, or with that which a sharp and well-informed reading could construct’ (R. Chartier, 
Texts, Printing, Readings, in: The New Cultural History, ed. by Lynn Hunt, Berkeley 1989, p. 165). This is a 
valuable corrective to the claim in the first printed edition of  Britton that the ‘first principles’ found in that 
book would illuminate the yearbooks, a claim which Cromartie implies also applied to the printing of  
Bracton (A. Cromartie, The constitutionalist revolution : an essay on the history of  England, 1450-1642, Cambridge 
2006, p. 100). In fact, for early-modern readers the yearbooks illuminated Bracton.  
66 See infra, nn. 118-125 and text and Williams, The Tudor Genesis (supra, n. 22), nn. 96-106 and text.  
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BRACTON AND THE COMMON-LAW CANON 
However, commonplacing alone did not ensure Bracton’s place in the common-law canon, 
nor did it explicitly overcome Fitzherbert’s objections to Bracton’s use. If nothing else, the 
habits of commonplacing did not explain why Bracton was a suitable book to integrate 
into a legal commonplace. It is rare, for example, to see texts from outside the common-
law tradition integrated into common lawyers’ commonplace books67. How, then, did 
Bracton become an accepted part of the common-law canon?  
 The most important conclusion is that there should be serious doubts about the 
effects of Fitzherbert’s statement about the place of Bracton in the common law. Bracton 
remained in use throughout the sixteenth century. Yale notes a seeming revival in 
references to Bracton in the early-Tudor period, but suggests this declines after the 
printing of Fitzherbert’s negative remarks68. In fact several references to Bracton can be 
found from late in the reign of Henry VIII to the printing of Bracton in 1569. In 1544 
Shelley J referred to Bracton with no hint of disapproval69; nine references to Bracton can 
be found in law reports from 1550-156970, a respectable number for a manuscript source; 
and in 1561 Catline CJ responded to a question from William Cecil by consulting 
Bracton71. William Fleetwood seems to have used a manuscript copy of Bracton when 
composing his treatise on the Admiralty Jurisdiction around 156872. Furthermore,  in the 
Inns of Court Bracton continued to be used. References can be found in 1527 and 154573. 
The latter, William Staunford’s reading on forfeiture for treason, contains more 
references to Bracton than to any other non-statutory source74, and Staunford continued 
to make considerable use of Bracton in his Plees del Coron, first printed in 1557. This 
                                                 
67 Dodderidge is a notable exception, see infra, n. 120 and text.  
68 Yale, “Of  No Mean Authority” (supra, n. 3), p. 383-4.  
69 See Baker, Oxford History (supra, n. 30), 649.  
70 Colthirst v Bejushin (1550) 1 Plowden 21, at 29; Throckmerton v Tracy (1555) 1 Plowden 145, at 159v; Stowel v 
Zouch (1569) 1 Plowden 353, at 357-358; Basset’s Case (1557) Dyer 136, at 137; The Duke of  Norfolk’s Case 
(1557) Dyer 138, at 138v; Thorn v Rolff (1560) Dyer 185; Hall v Kirby (1562) Dyer 217b; Lord Bray’s Case 
(1561) CUL MS Ll.3.14, fo. 30 at fo. 40; Hale’s Case (1569, printed as A briefe declaration for what manner of  
special nusance concerning private dwelling houses, a man may have his remedy by assise, or other action as the case requires, 
London 1639), p. 16. Baker has identified four more references to Bracton in reported cases from 1486-
1549, but describes earlier references as ‘very uncommon’ (Baker, Oxford History (supra, n. 30), p. 23 n. 90).  
71 The National Archives, SP 12/16, fo. 136. See infra, n. 81 and text.   
72 William Fleetwood, Certen Notes declaring Admirall Jurisdiction taken out of  the Queens Majesties Letters Patents, 
in: Hale and Fleetwood on Admiralty Jurisdiction, [Selden Society vol. 108], ed. by M.J. Prichard and D.E.C. 
Yale, London 1992, p. 121. For the dating, and manuscript use of  Bracton, see the editors’ introduction, p. 
xxv.  
73 BL. MS Harg. 87, fo. 399 and CUL MS Ee.5.19, fo. 113 (Francis Mountford’s 1527 reading on the Statute 
of  Westminster II (1285), cc. 12-13, concerning criminal procedure). Baker states that there are ‘many 
examples’ of  references to Bracton in surviving Inns of  Court material from the reign of  Henry VIII 
(Baker, Oxford History (supra, n. 30), p. 23 n. 91, which also has references to earlier examples).  
74 BL MS Harg. 92, fos. 86-103v.  
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evidence suggests common lawyer’s did not blindly follow Fitzherbert’s rejection of 
Bracton; in fact, they continued to use the text.  
 This argument is supported by the evidence that most lawyers who used Bracton 
seem to have ignored Fitzherbert’s rejection of the texts authority. Fulbeck warned his 
readers about using Bracton because the content was out of date, but never due to 
Fitzherbert’s denial of Bracton’s authority. In fact, other lawyers were happy to use Bracton 
without raising concerns about its status 75 . A rare occasion on which Fitzherbert’s 
challenge to Bracton’s status is referenced is in Stowel v Lord Zouch, where both Catline CJ 
and Saunders CB use Fitzherbert’s language, but it is not clear that they did more than 
pay lip-service to Fitzherbert’s restriction on the use of Bracton76. For example, Saunders 
used Bracton to set out the common law, and simply used cases to show that Bracton was 
correct. Furthermore, Plowden’s interpretation of the arguments of both the judges was 
that they cited ‘authorities’ out of Bracton as elements of their argument, suggesting that at 
least one early-modern lawyer did not consider them to be citing the text solely as 
ornament77. The only annotator before 1600 who even considers the matter is Edward 
Coke, and he considered Fitzherbert to be incorrect78! Nevertheless, as lawyers came to 
focus on textual bases for their arguments from the later sixteenth century, we might 
expect Fitzherbert’s criticism to be raised more frequently. But the same period also saw 
a number of developments which encouraged the use of Bracton.  
 The first important development antedates the printing of Bracton itself. In 1557 
William Staunford’s Plees del Coron was printed and describes Bracton, together with 
Glanvill and Britton as ‘vetustis legum scriptoribus’, a direct contradiction of the denial of 
Bracton’s authority found in Fitzherbert 79 . There is good evidence that a number of 
common lawyers came to Bracton via the use of the text in Staunford’s Plees, so this 
remark was probably of importance in challenging Fitzherbert’s statement. A number of 
annotators of Bracton can be seen cross-referencing to Staunford in their copies. These 
                                                 
75 References to Bracton after its printing, which do not consider restrictions on its use, include: Clere v 
Brook (1573) 2 Plowden 442, at 448v-449v and Zangis v Whiskard (1595) BL MS Additional 25211, fo. 124, 
at fo. 124v. Coke used the language of  ornament in Paine’s Case (supra, n. 28), 35, but see supra, n. 28, for the 
fact Coke was simply repeating another’s report. See infra, nn. 88-92 and text for evidence that Coke did 
not consider Bracton to be suitable only for use as ornament.  
76 Stowel v Zouch (supra, n. 70), 357-358. The other judges seem to accept this analysis of  Bracton's role.  
77 Stowel v Zouch (supra, n. 70), 357. For difficulties with the language of  ‘authority’ in this period, see I.S. 
Williams, English Legal Reasoning and Legal Culture, c.1530-c.1640, unpublished University of  Cambridge PhD 
thesis 2008, p. 25.  
78 See infra, nn. 88-92 and text.  
79 Staunford, Plees del Coron, London 1557, unpaginated ‘lectori’.  
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cross-references are to passages where Staunford himself cites Bracton, suggesting that the 
readers noted that part of Bracton precisely because it had been used by Staunford80.  
 Two more detailed examples can be provided. In 1561, Catline was consulted on 
whether witchcraft was an offence at common law. Catline’s reply was expressly based 
upon a consultation of Staunford (given the context, presumably the Plees del Coron), 
Bracton and Glanvill, with the tone suggesting that Staunford’s work was Catline’s first 
reference point81. A decade later, Catline described Bracton as an author in the common 
law in the Duke of Norfolk’s Case, translating the same point made in Staunford’s Plees del 
Coron82. Secondly, Thomas Egerton’s personal notes relating to some criminal matters 
include references to Staunford, followed by the references which Staunford includes to 
Bracton. Annotations in Thomas Egerton’s copy of Bracton can be linked directly to these 
personal notes, suggesting that Egerton obtained his references to Bracton from Staunford 
and then verified them from his copy of the book itself83. Staunford’s seeming role as a 
populariser of Bracton therefore indicates that his claim that Bracton was an author in the 
common law tradition would have been of importance in challenging Fitzherbert’s denial 
of that status84.  
 Other enhancements to Bracton’s status relate to the printed edition itself. As 
Chartier has shown in a very different context, the simple title of a book can affect the 
expectations of its readers and their decision to read the work 85 . The early-modern 
common lawyer Robert Callis was a little more circumspect, but still acknowledged that 
the title of a work could inform a reader’s understanding of the text. For Callis, ‘in Acts 
and Books the Titles and Stiles may give help in the Exposition’ (emphasis added)86. 
Bracton, conveniently, titled itself as a book on the laws and customs of England, 
indicating to readers that it was a common-law book and therefore suitable for 
integration into common-law material. Furthermore, Bracton’s title-page states that it was 
                                                 
80 Bracton GUL, fos. 3v, 4, 30, 55v, 77, 85, 104v-105, 118v-127v (there is also a reference to Staunford’s 
Prerogative del Roy on fo.14); Bracton SLL, fo. 139; Bracton AL, fo. 30.  
81 Supra, n. 71.  
82 Supra, n. 79 and text. The same point was also made in the editor's preface to the printed edition of  
Bracton, see infra, n. 87 and text.  
83 In HEH MS El. 496, fo. 162v, Egerton’s use of  Bracton is expressly linked with Staunford’s use of  the text 
in his Prerogative del Roy. See infra, n. 107, for further links between Egerton, Bracton and Staunford.  
84  The preface to the 1604 printing of Glanvill referred to Staunford as procuring the first printing 
(Glanville, Tractatus de legibus (supra, n. 5), sig. *iii), a report which Coke subsequently repeated (Edward 
Coke, The fourth part of the Institutes of the laws of England concerning the jurisdiction of courts, London 1644, p. 345 
margin). If this is combined with Staunford’s use of Bracton in his criminal law text generating demand for 
that book to be printed, Staunford may be the key figure in the early-modern popularisation of the oldest 
common-law texts. His role (and any particular cause of it) merits serious consideration.  
85 Chartier, Texts, Printing, Readings (supra, n. 65), p. 166-167.  
86 Robert Callis, The Reading of  That Famous and Learned Gentleman, Robert Callis Esq; Sergeant at Law, Upon the 
Statute of  23 H.8.Cap.5. of  Sewers, London, 1647, p. 6. The reading was delivered in 1622.  
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printed by Richard Tottell under the auspisces of the monopoly common-law printing 
patent, providing reinforcement for the impression that this was viewed as a book within 
the common-law tradition. Finally, Thomas Norton’s preface referred to Bracton as an 
‘autor de Iure’87. The printed volume itself therefore proclaimed Bracton to be a work in the 
common-law tradition, contrary to the remarks of Fitzherbert.  
 Finally, other readers of Bracton seem to have come to the text from Edward 
Coke’s references to it 88 , and Coke engaged directly with Fitzherbert’s challenge to 
Bracton’s status. The title-page to Coke’s copy of Bracton contains a set of notes which 
challenge the claim that Bracton was not an author in the common law. The notes can be 
divided into two types, although the two shade into one another. The first type consists 
simply of references to Bracton in the year-books, thereby demonstrating that Bracton was 
an author in ‘our law’. This was a simple rejection of the statement in Fitzherbert that 
Bracton was not an author in the common law through the examination of other 
evidence89. The other discussion cites references within Bracton to the author’s own status 
as a judge. Yale has described this ‘belief as to judicial status’ as ‘material to the authority 
of De Legibus’90. From Coke’s notes we can go further: for Coke himself, the belief in the 
judicial status of the author of Bracton was the principal justification for the authority of 
the book. Coke’s response to the challenge of Bracton’s status places the court at the 
centre, either as accepting the authority of the text, or as the author being a judge of the 
court himself. Coke’s legal thought focussed on the role of the judges in crafting and 
ensuring the excellence of the common law and in understanding its ‘artificial reason’91. 
Given the increased attention paid to judicial statements of the law in the later sixteenth 
century, Coke’s approach to Bracton’s authority might not be unique92.  
                                                 
87  Bracton, sig. 1¶ii. It is possible that the simple fact of  printing came to support the use of  Bracton. On the 
the preference common lawyers seem to have developed for printed material, see I. Williams, “He Creditted 
More the Printed Booke”: Common Lawyers’ Receptivity to Print, c.1550-1640, Law and History Review, 28 (2010), p. 
39-70, especially p. 66-7.  
88 As with Staunford, readers of  Bracton can be seen marking passages in Bracton which are cited by Coke 
(Bracton KCL, fo. 58v; Bracton BL1, fo. 124; Bracton LIL1, fo. 53).   
89 Judicial approval of  a text was always an important element in Coke’s thought. In 1599, Coke discussed 
the authority of  Fleta in legal argument, and relied on the fact of  prior use evidenced in law reports to 
justify his citation of  the text (Hallyocke v White (1599) BL MS Additional 25203, fo. 53), and in the preface 
to the Commentary on Littleton, Coke cited a Jacobean case where the judges approved Littleton’s text and 
said that the cases in it must not be ‘disputed or questioned’ (Edward Coke, The first part of  the Institutes of  
the lawes of  England. Or, A Commentarie vpon Littleton, London, 1628, sig. ¶¶2).  
90 Yale, “Of  No Mean Authority” (supra, n. 3), n. 32. Yale refers to Coke and later writers. Lupoi has recently 
suggested that a ‘feeling of  commonalty’ between the common and civil laws enabled ‘Bracton to came 
[sic] back as an authoritative source’ (M. Lupoi, Trust and Confidence, Law Quarterly Review, 125 (2009), p. 
286). Annotated copies of  Bracton show little to no evidence to support this assertion.  
91 See Williams., English Legal Reasoning (supra, n. 77), p. 15-18.  
92 The only evidence found in the annotated copies is Bracton ASC, titlepage which quotes Coke on the title 
page, noting Coke’s statements that Bracton wrote in the time of  Henry III and that Bracton was both a 
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THE UTILITY OF BRACTON 
Early-modern readers were selective, and the annotated copies provide evidence of 
which passages were of more interest. Historians of reading have noted the tendency for 
early-modern readers to be ‘pragmatic readers’ who read for a particular purpose, actively 
looking for material related to particular concerns 93 . Given this fact, and that the 
annotations in Bracton do demonstrate particular interests on the part of readers, it is 
legitimate to infer that these interests may have spurred their reading of the book. The 
annotations of the common lawyers who read Bracton show that their interest was in the 
legal content94. This section of the article will consider some of the particular interests of 
common lawyers when reading Bracton. In a number of cases, the evidence from the 
copies of Bracton suggests that certain isolated uses of Bracton visible in law reports were 
not atypical and therefore that Bracton should at least be considered as a possible 
formative influence on the law in a number of fields in the early-modern period.  
 The most obvious pattern of annotation is a tendency to annotate the start of 
Bracton (where Bracton gives a civilian discussion of legal theory) and the material on 
criminal law95. Even those annotators who show a wider range of interests often have a 
higher concentration of annotations on these topics96. The reason behind this is not 
difficult to discern, and in the case of criminal law has already been observed by Baker – 
a shortage of other available material on the topics as lawyers came to rely on textual 
sources for their understanding of the law, rather than the largely unprinted common 
learning97. The difficulties with criminal law were pronounced – criminal law was not a 
common feature of the yearbooks, or of sixteenth-century legal literature 98 . In fact, 
                                                                                                                                            
judge in the Common Pleas and a ‘writer of  the laws’.  
93 See supra, n. 55 and text.  
94 William Lambarde was a common lawyer who was an exception to this statement; he used Bracton as a 
source for his antiquarian research, although it seems that even some of  his annotations are directed to 
more practical ends, such as Lambarde’s work as a Justice of  the Peace (see, e.g., Bracton SUL, fos. 288v and 
292v which concern perjury and attaint of  juries, bodies about which Lambarde was sometimes critical as a 
magistrate).  
95 Bracton, fos. 1-10 and 115-128.  
96 Eg., Bracton ASC, fos. 115v-142 and Bracton SUL, fos. 105, 115v onwards and fos. 288v and 292v on 
matters arguably concerned with criminal process (particularly for Lambarde’s work as a JP), perjury and 
attaint.  
97 Baker, Oxford History (supra, n. 30), p. 529.  
98 A good example of  this difficulty is Bracton GUL, fos. 118v-127v, where the plentiful cross-references to 
other criminal law material have only two references to substantive legal material from the early-modern 
period, in both cases from Plowden’s Commentaries. The other references are to Staunford’s Plees, Glanvill, 
Britton, and to William Lambarde’s work. Seipp has suggested that there is rather more criminal law in the 
yearbooks than is traditionally expected (D.J. Seipp, Crime in the Year Books, in: Law Reporting in England: 
proccedings of  the eleventh British Legal History Conference, ed. by C. Stebbings, London 1995, p. 16-
17). Copies of  Bracton where annotations focus on the criminal law material include Bracton DCC, fos. 115v 
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lawyers seem to have shown relatively little interest in criminal law. A sample of early-
modern commonplace books found in Cambridge University Library suggests that 
almost half (seven of eighteen) made no reference to any criminal law matters at all99. 
When, or if, lawyers did need to consider criminal law, it seems that a number of them 
might not have had source material readily available, and would have needed to read new 
books100. The obvious choice would be Staunford’s Plees del Coron, and this book does 
seem to have encouraged lawyers to read Bracton itself101.  
 This use of Bracton to provide material where other sources were lacking is typical 
of the other frequent uses to which Bracton was put and which will be discussed below. 
This conclusion also explains why Bracton never became a standard reference work - the 
text’s principal use was in areas of uncertainty or where existing texts were inadequate. 
While the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were periods of dramatic change, most of 
the law was not uncertain. This also explains why legal change between the time of  the 
writing of Bracton and the early-modern reading of the text was of less concern than 
might be expected: Bracton was used in situations where lawyers were uncertain what the 
law was and therefore legal change was not obvious102.  
 
Proof and witnesses  
Common law courts did not generally raise questions concerning the adequacy of proof 
as issues of fact were determined by the jury, nor did they consider whether certain 
numbers of witnesses were required103. However, on occasion such matters could be 
raised. Due to the relative absence of such material from common-law literature, lawyers 
seem to have turned to Bracton. The annotated copies show three readers were clearly 
                                                                                                                                            
onwards; Bracton HEH, fos. 118v-119, 143 and 145; Bracton GUL, fos. 118v-127v; Bracton KCL, fo. 105; 
Bracton LIL2, fos. 118v-121.  
99  The following commonplace books did not have any obvious criminal law discussion: CUL MSs 
Dd.4.41; Dd.4.62; Ii.5.28 (this copy has a reference to treason on the contents page, but not in the main 
text); Gg.3.5; Ee.6.15; Add. 3295; Ii.5.29. It is possible some criminal law was placed under property law 
headings concerning escheat 
100 Evidently Staunford’s use of Bracton cannot be explained on this basis. Staunford’s reading may have 
been an occasion for Staunford to show his erudition (an early example of the trend that became more 
pronounced in the later-sixteenth century) and his interest in Bracton was piqued as a result of that. 
Certainly Baker has described all readers who made references to learned law as ‘exceptional’, and the 
readers who used civil law (as Staunford did), rather than canon law, were atypical within that small 
minority (J.H. Baker, Roman Law at the Third University of England, Current Legal Problems, 55 (2002), p. 145). 
Staunford may consciously have made his reading exceptional.  
101 See supra, n. 80 and text.  
102 Where readers did note that the law had changed, these annotations were in parts of  Bracton less 
frequently annotated. See, e.g., Bracton THL, fos. 28v and 63; KCL 12v and SLL 139.  
103 It was also only in the reign of  Elizabeth that witnesses could be compelled to testify (Perjury Act 5 
Eliz. I, c.9), although the practice may already have existed. 
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concerned with rules about witnesses, for example the number required 104 . More 
specifically, Bracton was put forward by the Duke of Norfolk in his trial for treason on 
the law concerning the eligibility of witnesses, and the authority of the book was 
accepted for that purpose105.  
 In addition to being raised in unusual circumstances such as treason trials (where 
common-law judges advised the commissioners trying the facts directly), the other likely 
reason for a concern about witnesses and proof relates to jurisdictions other than the 
common-law courts. Courts such as the Chancery and Star Chamber did not make use of 
juries. The common lawyers appearing before such tribunals therefore needed to engage 
with questions of proof. An important example here is Thomas Egerton, whose copy of 
Bracton shows an interest in modes of trial and proof. For example, one of his more 
heavily annotated sections in Bracton concerns indictments on suspicion106 . Egerton’s 
personal papers show links between his reading Bracton and his work in the Star 
Chamber107. In this sense Bracton may be an overlooked source influencing the emerging 
ideas of evidence in those jurisdictions108. Certainly an observer of Dyer in the Star 
Chamber considered that his reference to the idea that nemo tenetur seipsum prodere was a 
reference to ‘Bractons principall’109. A final possible explanation for the role of Bracton 
lies in the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth century jurisdictional disputes with the 
ecclesiastical courts. Issues about the number of witnesses were newly raised in these 
disputes through the use of writs of prohibition. The requirement of two witnesses in 
ecclesiastical courts was a point of contention between the common and ecclesiastical 
                                                 
104 E.g., Bracton BL2, fos. 38 and 61; Bracton AL fo. 38 (which features a reference to Plowden’s Commentaries 
on the same point) and Bracton SLL, fo. 118v. For discussion of  the requirement of  two witnesses more 
generally, see M.R.T. Macnair, The Law of  Proof  in Early Modern Equity, Berlin 1999, p. 249-253.  
105 The Trial of  Thomas Howard duke of  Norfolk, before the Lords at Westminster, for High Treason (1571) 1 St Tr 
col. 957, at col. 1026. The Duke of  Norfolk raised the argument that witnesses must be freemen and must 
not be traitors, outlaws or attainted.  
106 Bracton HEH, fo. 143.  
107 HEH MSs El. 453 and 485, fo. 2v feature references to Bracton in material for Star Chamber.  
108 E.g., Macnair, The Law of  Proof  (supra, n. 104).   
109 British Library MS Harleian 859, fo. 50 (printed in J. Bruce, Observations upon certain Proceedings in the Star-
chamber against Lord Vaux, Sir Thomas Tresham, Sir William Catesby, and others, for refusing to swear that they had not 
harboured Campion the Jesuit, Archaeologia, 30 (1844), p. 104 and in Select Cases in the Council of  Henry VII, 
[Selden Society vol. 75], ed. by C.G. Bayne and W.H. Dunham, London 1956, p. xciv n.6). Dyer himself  
does not refer to this point in his personal notes (see Reports from the Lost Notebooks of  Sir James Dyer, [Selden 
Society vol. 110], ed. by J.H. Baker, vol.2, London 1994, p. 390 and 397). The maxim is not found in 
Bracton, but the reference shows an observer who presumably at least knew of  Bracton associating Bracton 
with the law of  evidence. Gray’s extensive discussion of  prohibition cases and self-incrimination does not 
refer to Bracton in connection with the maxim (C.M. Gray, The Writ of  Prohibition: jurisdiction in early modern 
English law, 2 vols., New York 1994, vol.2, p. 293-423).  
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lawyers, and common lawyers may have been looking to Bracton for assistance in this 
field110.  
 
Servitudes  
The evidence from copies of Bracton corroborates Yale’s suggestion that Bracton’s 
consideration of servitudes as iura in re aliena was ‘one ready source of material to give 
some order and substance’ to the emergence of the law of servitudes from the law of 
nuisance in the sixteenth century, another field in which existing common-law literature 
was arguably lacking111. If so, this would be an example of a situation where the reading 
of Bracton had the potential to introduce a romanisation of the common law. Yale based 
his suggestion on the evidence of a discussion in Sury v Albon Pigot (1625), where 
Whitlock J cited Bracton on servitudes 112 . The case in itself may not provide much 
evidence: Whitlock was a trained civilian113, and Dodderidge and Jones JJ both had some 
knowledge of the civil law114. As such, it would be possible to argue that the judges there 
were predisposed to a civilian analysis and that Bracton served, at most, as a means of 
legitimising that approach. However, three of the annotated copies of Bracton, including 
that of Coke, show that readers were interested in Bracton’s discussion of servitudes; 
William Lambarde’s copy not only shows Lambarde’s interest in the same topic, but also 
has Lambarde using Bracton to organise the law of servitudes into diagrammatic form, 
albeit not following the civilian model115. Coke’s interest in his copy is reflected in his 
Commentary on Littleton, where Coke explains that the common law recognises three kinds 
of right of way, giving them the civilian titles of iter, actus and via, explicitly citing Bracton 
for the point116. Simpson is correct that the law of easements was still developing in the 
                                                 
110 C.M. Gray, Prohibitions and the privilege against self-incrimination, in: Tudor Rule and Revolution, ed. by D.J. 
Guth and J.W. McKenna, Cambridge 1982, p. 350-352). For more detail on prohibitions and the two-
witness rule see Gray, The Writ of  Prohibition (supra, n. 106), vol. 2, p. 207-291. 
111 Yale, “Of  No Mean Authority” (supra, n. 3), p. 388.  
112 References can be found in the reports printed in Popham 166, at 171 and Buls. 339, at 340. Getzler 
suggests that the latter of  these references shows that Whitlock was actually trying to reduce the impact of  
Bracton in this area, as Bracton had an expansive concept of  servitudes (Getzler, History of  Water Rights (supra, 
n. 3), p. 131-2).  
113 Exceptionally unusually for a common law, he had a degree in the civil law. For Whitlock’s use of  the 
civil law, particularly in an educational context, see Baker, Roman Law (supra, n. 100), p. 136-137 and 141-
144.  
114 For Dodderidge, see infra, n. 120 and text. Jones made reference to canon law in Russell v Ligorne (1637) 
CUL MS Gg.ii.20, fo. 1023v, at fo. 1024v, although the language of  the reference suggests Jones was 
referring to earlier English ecclesiastical court practice, rather than the learned law directly.  
115 See Bracton, fo. 221 in ASC, DCC and GLL. For Lambarde, see Bracton SUL, fo. 221v.  
116 Coke, Commentarie on Littleton (supra, n. 89), fo. 56.  
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1620s, and so ‘the subject…is hardly mentioned in Coke’s commentary on Littleton’, but 
where it is, we find Bracton, and in this Coke was not unrepresentative117.  
 
Contract  
One annotator of Bracton raises the intriguing possibility of an influence upon the law of 
contract. That annotator inserted the word ‘assumpsit’ next to the index entry for Bracton’s 
chapter on the stipulatio118. This annotator was not the only common lawyer to link the 
stipulatio and assumpsit; John Dodderidge did the same in his argument in Slade’s Case, 
expressly citing Bracton for the proposition that ‘bare stipulacion’ alleged in the assumpsit 
claim in Slade’s Case lacked consideration119. Had such links between Bracton’s essentially 
civilian discussion and the early-modern common law been established firmly by the 
reading of Bracton there would have been the potential for a substantial romanising of the 
common law. Certainly Dodderidge did not view the two as incompatible: his 
commonplace often features civilian sententiae or maxims immediately underneath 
contemporary common-law headings, with that civilian content then followed by 
standard common-law material, integrating the two legal traditions120. 
 Bracton’s discussion of the stipulatio followed the civil law in its discussion of the 
formal contract. There is no explicit evidence of a civilian concept of the stipulatio 
becoming part of English law. In theory, there was a large difference between the 
stipulatio as a civilian institution and the early-modern law of contract, which was split 
between the actions of covenant, debt and assumpsit. The common law assumpsit was a 
very different institution to the stipulatio, not a contract (nor, as Nicholas describes the 
stipulatio, a ‘method of contracting’121) but rather a mode of bringing a contractual claim. 
Assumpsit claims tended to be based on oral contracts (in this sense being similar to the 
classical civilian stipulatio), but these contracts had no prescribed formalities. In this sense 
the link between Bracton and assumpsit seems to be based, at best, on serious 
misunderstanding of civilian ideas.  
 However, Bracton’s discussion of the stipulatio is taken from Justinian’s Institutes. As 
Ibbetson has observed, the discussion of the stipulatio in the Institutes is where ‘we find the 
most substantial treatment of the general principles of contractual liability’ in Roman 
                                                 
117 A.W.B. Simpson, A History of  the Land Law, 2nd ed., Oxford 1986, p. 115.  
118 Bracton SLL, sig. 2¶iiv.  
119 BL MS Harleian 6809, fos. 45-46v, at 46v. Dodderidge noted Bracton, fo. 98v in the margin of  fo.45, 
when considering actions generally. Bracton’s discussion of  stipulatio is on fo. 99v.  
120 E.g. BL MS Harg. 407, fos.  59v and 62v. Dodderidge’s commonplace also includes references to Bracton 
(eg. fos. 74v, 95v and 111v). 
121 B. Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law, Oxford 1975, p. 193.  
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law122. In fact, the formal elements in the stipulatio are little discussed in either Justinian’s 
Institutes or Bracton (for example, the requirement for correspondence between the 
question and the answer can be inferred from the text, but is not stated explicitly as a 
rule), rendering any equivalence between the stipulatio and the English law of contract 
more plausible. The readers of Bracton who drew the link between the stipulatio and 
English contract law were perhaps looking for just such a convenient statement of 
relatively unknown, or at least inexplicit, general principles123.  
 To take one example, the emerging concept of consideration made reference to 
the civilian idea ex nudo pacto non oritur actio, and the same concept was also used in the 
property law context of uses124. While it is only in Throckmerton v Tracy that we see Bracton 
being explicitly associated with this maxim, lawyers’ familiarity with the language of bare 
pacts, combined with the association of the idea of bare pacts with Bracton may have 
encouraged them to link passages in Bracton considering bare pacts with the common law 
of consideration in the action of assumpsit. Certainly that seems to be Dodderidge’s 
thought process. By so doing, Bracton’s presentation of the Roman law of the stipulatio 
might have affected their conceptualisation of the general ideas of contract actionable in 
assumpsit.  
 However, the example of the stipulatio provides a good example of one of the 
difficulties in this area: we can see that circumstances were ripe for some influence from 
material like that in Bracton, and that some common lawyers, including Dodderidge, do 
seem to have read Bracton and made the relevant links, but we do not have express 
evidence of this view having any particular effects 125 . Bracton, and the civilian ideas 
mediated through Bracton, may have shaped common-law thinking, but the thinking 
cannot easily be uncovered. From the perspective of any consideration of a ‘reception’ of 
Roman law, or the ius commune, in England, the reading of Bracton therefore provides 
another elusive fragment of evidence but does not lead to clear conclusions.  
 
                                                 
122 D.J. Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of  Obligations, Oxford 1999, p. 7. 
123 In this regard, perhaps Bracton actually performed the role that the printer of  the first edition of  Britton 
had claimed for that work (see supra, n. 65 and text)!  
124 J.H. Baker, Origins of  the “doctrine” of  consideration, in: On the Laws and Customs of  England, ed. by 
Arnold et al. (supra, n. 3), p. 336. For the conveyancing context, see Throckmerton v Tracy (supra, n. 70), 161v, 
where Saunders J cited Bracton to introduce the civil law on clothed pacts. Although the case concerned a 
conveyance, rather than the usual issues of  contract law, the resort to Bracton and such civilian ideas may 
support the idea that Bracton had more of  an influence on common lawyers’ thinking in this area than is 
immediately apparent. 
125 Baker (Origins (supra, n. 124), p. 351-2) considers that the use of  the civilian language of  bare pacts had 
no noticeable effect on the development of  the doctrine of  consideration as only the language was 
borrowed, not the substance.  
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Criminal Law - Treason  
Bracton's influence was not confined to occasions when lawyers searched for guidance on 
novel questions or for substantive rules. On occasion, reading Bracton could have more 
subtle, but perhaps more important, effects. An instance of this is the law of treason. The 
English law of treason was confused, and confusing, from the 1550s to the 
Interregnum 126 . Henry VIII introduced new treason legislation after the break with 
Rome, starting a tradition of statutory changes to the law of treason which continued 
through the reigns of his children. This sometimes left the source of the law of treason in 
doubt: in 1603 Popham CJ even asserted that all the treason statutes had been repealed 
and only the common law of treason remained127! This was an unusual position; most 
lawyers recognised the continuing effect of at least the first Treason Act from 1352, a 
statute typically taken as the starting point for discussions of treason in the reign of 
Elizabeth and onwards 128 . This section will consider an important conceptual 
development in the law of treason in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, before 
demonstrating Bracton’s role in that development.  
The Treason Act stated that there were six types of treason: compassing or 
imagining the death of the King, his wife or heir; levying war on the King in his realm; 
adhering to the King’s enemies; violating various female members of the royal family 
with the corresponding risk of an heir not of the royal blood; counterfeiting the great or 
privy seal or coin or importing counterfeit coin; and killing the Chancellor, Lord 
Treasurer or judges129. Of these various types of treason, that of compassing or imagining 
the death of the King was often interpreted extremely expansively by lawyers as 
‘constructive treason’130. Royal lawyers sometimes relied upon the 1352 forms of treason 
even when more specific statutory treasons existed, because the older legislation did not 
include some of the procedural protections given to defendants in Tudor treason acts131.  
                                                 
126 For an example of  this confusion see L.M. Hill, The Two-Witness Rule in English Treason Trials: Some 
Comments on the Emergence of  Procedural Law, American Journal of  Legal History, 12 (1968), 95-111 and D. 
Cressy, Dangerous Talk: Scandalous, Seditious, and Treasonable Speech in pre-modern England, Oxford 2010, p. 41 
and 265-7.  
127 R v Sir Walter Raleigh (1603) 2 State Trials col. 2, col. 13. Popham was using the confusion in the law to 
prevent Raleigh’s claims to stricter requirements of  proof  based on statutory forms of  treason. Coke was 
willing to assert simply that Raleigh had misunderstood the statutes (R v Raleigh, col. 8). The effect of  
legislation and repeals was unclear even in the reign of  Mary, see the discussion in Serjeant’s Inn in 1556 
reported by William Dalison (The Reports of  William Dalison, 1552-1558, [Selden Society Volume 124], ed. by 
J.H. Baker, London 2007, p. 106).  
128 L.J. Ward, The Law of Treason in the Reign of Elizabeth I 1558-1588, unpublished University of Cambridge 
PhD thesis 1985, p. 13.  
129 Stat.25.Ed.3, c.2.  
130 See, e.g., Ward, The Law of  Treason (supra, n. 126), p. 15-16.  
131 Ward, The Law of  Treason (supra, n. 126), p. 166.  
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However, around 1600, early-modern common lawyers began to use the language 
of the Roman crimen maiestatis and laesae maiestatis in their own discussions of treason132. 
This was a change in vocabulary, but also more than that. The change in language 
provided an intellectual justification for a changed concept of treason, one which did not 
focus on the Treason Act 1352 or other statutory treasons.  
 The utility of this changed concept can be seen in remarks by two lawyers. For 
both Edward Coke and Christopher Yelverton, the changed view of treason as laesae 
maiestatis provided a theoretical core to the law of treason. The development was one of 
intellectualisation: systematising and justifying existing ideas into a coherent whole 133. But 
by laying new foundations for the law of treason, new law could be built.  
 In the trial of  the gunpowder plotters for conspiring to detonate gunpowder 
under Parliament and thereby to kill the King, nobility and judges (amongst others), Coke 
stated that treason was laesae maiestatis. Coke then used the concept of  maiestas to explain 
why killing the judges amounted to treason. According to Coke killing judges was a 
challenge to the King’s authority, with the judges representing the ‘majesty’ of  the 
King134. The act was therefore laesae maiestatis and treason. Rather than relying simply on 
the relevant statutory provisions, Coke instead rationalised the statutory treason as an 
example of  a broader crime of  laesae maiestatis135.  
 Christopher Yelverton’s approach was similar, but moved beyond the forms of 
statutory treason. Yelverton explained that ‘to alter the state, change the religion, inforce 
                                                 
132 See, e.g., R v Sir Christopher Blunt et al (1600) 1 State Trials col. 1415, col. 1419 per Christopher Yelverton; 
Edward Coke, Le second part des reportes del Edward Coke, London (1602), sig. ¶ivv (preface to Coke’s second 
volume of  reports, alluding to Essex as ‘the greatest offender’ whose crime was ‘crimen laesae maiestatis’); R v 
Sir Walter Raleigh (supra, n. 127), col. 7 and R v Robert Winter, Thomas Winter, Guy Fawkes et al (1606) 2 State 
Trials col. 159, col. 167. The change is also visible in legal literature: William West described treason as an 
offence against the ‘majesty’ of  the ‘commonwealth’ (William West, Symbolaeography, part 2, London 1594, 
sect. 213); Ferdinando Pulton, De Pace (supra, n. 10), fo. 109 (Pulton references Bracton on treason at fo. 
109v) and Robert Holborne, The Reading in Lincolnes-Inne, Feb.28.1641 Upon the Stat. of  25.E.3. cap.2. Being the 
Statute of  Treasons (1642, Leonard Lichfield, Oxford) both used the language of  laesae maiestatis. 
Unsurprisingly the language of  laesae maiestatis is visible in work by lawyers with some civilian learning: 
William West's Symbolaeography is one such example (and was explicitly relied upon by the civilian John 
Cowell when defining treason in his The Interpreter or booke containing the Signification of  Words, London 1607, 
sig. Vvv1v). Thomas Smith, the first Regius Professor of  civil law at Cambridge University, also linked 
treason and laesae maiestatis, although he does not clearly equate the two (Thomas Smith, De Republica 
Anglorum, London 1583, p. 84). See infra nn. 155-6 and text for the earliest links between treason and laesae 
maiestatis made by early-modern common lawyers.  
133 On the idea of  intellectualisation, particularly from the use of  civilian derived material, see F. Wieacker, 
A History of  Private Law in Europe, trans. A. Weir, Oxford 1995, especially p. 95-7 in the German context. 
Such intellectualisation did occur in the common law of  inheritance in the late-sixteenth century (see 
Williams, English Legal Reasoning (supra, n. 77), p. 122-124).  
134 R v Robert Winter (supra, n. 132), col. 168.  
135 Coke's analytical approach is the same as that taken by Bracton, who gave forgery as an example of  the 
crimen laesae maiestatis (see infra, n. 148 and text). Lawyers in treason trials rarely cited authority, but it is 
possible that Coke took his analytical approach from Bracton.  
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the prince to settle power, and for subjects to say things at their list, is crimen laesae 
maiestatis; and all Indictments term this treason: for that subject that will rule his prince, 
will never be ruled by his prince’136. This is a classical idea of laesae maiestatis, indeed 
Yelverton was deliberately drawing parallels with the allegations against Catiline. While 
the idea of altering religion (or law) as constituting treason can be seen from the mid-
sixteenth century, it then lacked any clear justification - it was simply assumed that 
interference with this aspect of the Crown's role was treason137. For Yelverton, however, 
laesae maiestatis provided a conceptual basis for the development of the law of treason in 
Reformation England beyond that covered by statute.  
 This flexibility in the understanding of treason ultimately enabled claims in the 
reign of Charles I that actions of royal officials which were considered to be contrary to 
established law could be treason, even if these actions were in accordance with the 
wishes of the King. Orr has drawn attention to the similarities with the crimen maiestatis138, 
and to the significance of this development as a crucial stage in moving concepts of 
treason from a focus on endangering the King to a crime against the State. Treason came 
to be conceived as a crime of acting against the established laws and jurisdictions. 
Although it did not become clearly defined as a crime against an impersonal ‘State’, that 
concept was emerging139. From that position, treason could then be asserted as the legal 
justification for the 1649 trial and execution, for acting contrary to the established laws, 
of the king himself!   
 No real explanation has been provided for the change in vocabulary and ensuing 
conceptual change. The only historian to comment on the development simply observes 
that  
                                                 
136 R v Sir Christopher Blunt et al (supra, n. 132), col. 1419. This concept of  treason is very close to that 
propounded by Edward Coke in his Third part of  the Institutes of  the laws of  England concerning high treason, and 
other pleas of  the crown, and criminall causes, London 1644, p. 12. Bellamy considers that ‘[l]ese-majesty was a 
term virtually never used by the common lawyers and suggests some desperation or new policy on the part 
of  the queen’s legal advisers’ (J. Bellamy, The Tudor Law of  Treason, London 1979, p. 80), not considering the 
evidence below (infra, nn. 147-164 and text) that shows relatively widespread links between ideas of  treason 
and laesae maiestatis around 1600.  
137 R v Crofte (1554) in: Baker, Reports (supra, n. 127), p. 63-4. Bellamy notes that seeking to change the 
established religion was increasingly included in treason indictments from 1570, but ‘was not part of  any 
particular act and was thus not essential for their soundness in law’ (Bellamy, Tudor Law (supra, n. 136), p. 67 
and 81).  
138 For this paragraph, see D.A. Orr, Treason and the State: Law, Politics, and Ideology in the English Civil War, 
Cambridge 2002.  
139 Holdsworth stresses that in this period ‘treason must come to be regarded as essentially an offence, and 
the most heinous offence, against the state’ (W.S. Holdsworth, A History of  English Law, London 1969, vol. 
8, p. 322). For the emerging concept of  the State in the sixteenth century see Q. Skinner, The Foundations of  
Modern Political Thought, Cambridge 1978, especially vol. 2, p. 349-358.  
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[t]here can be no doubt that in practice the English conception of high treason bore strong 
familial resemblances to that of the Roman law and that the appropriation of Roman law 
concepts into the English law of treason was well advanced at the outbreak of the English Civil 
War. How this state of affairs came to pass is less important than the fact that English jurists of 
the early seventeenth century generally accepted these points of commonality as consistent with 
the traditions of English law140.  
The exigencies of particular treason trials cannot explain the change in vocabulary and 
the underlying change in the notion of treason itself141.  
A more fruitful explanation lies in early-modern education. In the second half of 
the sixteenth century, all educated Englishmen shared a common training in Latin and 
particularly rhetoric142. As the author of the leading study on the Roman law of maiestas 
has observed, most of our knowledge of Roman ideas of the crimen maiestatis comes from 
literary and historical texts, not the juristic works of the Corpus Iuris Civilis which were the 
focus of consideration in the revived legal tradition of medieval and early-modern 
Europe143. Some of these Roman texts which discussed the crimen maiestatis were part of 
an English rhetorical education144. The language of crimen maiestatis and laesae maiestatis can 
therefore be regarded as part of the common intellectual background of early-modern 
Englishmen145. While this explains the substantive knowledge of the crimen maiestatis, it 
does not explain how common lawyers came to view the common law as the same as 
Roman law on this point.  
 The argument here is that Bracton played an important role in this change. Bracton 
did not provide common lawyers with knowledge of the substance of the Roman crimen 
maiestatis, but Bracton did not need to do so. What Bracton provided was the means for the 
                                                 
140 Orr, Treason (supra, n. 138), p. 45. Orr is concerned with political thought in the seventeenth century 
(and principally in the tumultuous years of  the 1640s), not the development of  legal doctrine, so his lack 
of  concern is unsurprising. The only evidence brought forward as a possible explanation is the presence of  
Roman law books in Edward Coke's library.  
141  For example, references to the crimen maiestatis in the trial of  the gunpowder plotters, and Coke's 
explanation of  the law of  treason there, were entirely superfluous - the actions of  the gunpowder plotters 
clearly placed them within the provisions of  the Treason Act 1352.  
142 For the thoroughly Latin, and rhetorical, education of  Elizabethan England, see P. Mack, Elizabethan 
rhetoric: theory and practice, Cambridge 2002, especially p. 11-47 (for education in the grammar schools).  
143 R.A. Bauman, The Crimen Maiestatis in the Roman Republic and Augustan Principate, Johannesburg 1967, p. 
xvi.  
144 For example, the Rhetorica ad Herennium, which discusses competing definitions of  maiestas (see Bauman, 
Crimen Maiestatis (supra, n. 143), p. 3) and Cicero’s ‘many definitions’ throughout his works (Bauman, Crimen 
Maiestatis (supra, n. 143), p. 35 and 51-2). See Mack, Elizabethan rhetoric (supra, n. 142), p. 51-2 for evidence 
that these texts were widely read (or owned), at least at university level.  
145 Cressy observes that the Roman notion of  crimen laesae maiestatis was ‘well known to Tudor statesmen’ 
(Cressy, Dangerous Talk (supra, n. 126), p. 285 n. 2).  
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vocabulary of laesae maiestatis to be considered as part of the common law tradition, and 
for it to be equivalent to the recognised law of treason146.  
 As a Latin work, Bracton did not use the language of treason, but the discussion of 
pleas of the crown included a section entitled ‘de crimine laesae maiestatis et suis speciebus’. 
The substance of Bracton’s crimen laesae maiestatis listed ways of committing the crime, the 
first of which was compassing the death of the king, just as in the Treason Act 1352147. 
Another species of the crimen laesae maiestatis was the crime of forgery, exemplified by 
forging the king’s seal or counterfeiting money, two specific forms of treason under the 
Treason Act 1352148 . Common lawyers reading Bracton would therefore come across 
passages specifying forms of treason since set out in statute as species of the crimen laesae 
maiestatis149.  
 Bracton would not have been an unusual reference point for the small group of 
elite lawyers concerned with treason cases. As noted above, the discussion of criminal 
law in Bracton was one of the most popular with early-modern readers, presumably due to 
a shortage of other material150. Furthermore, the standard work on criminal law, William 
Staunford's Plees del Coron commenced its discussion of treason with Bracton's text151. The 
significance of Staunford's contribution can be seen in the work of William Fleetwood. 
In his treatise on the Admiralty, Fleetwood included a section entitled ‘Treason and 
traytors and misprision of treason’ in which he advised his readers to consult Staunford’s 
Plees del Coron152.  
 Evidence from the annotated copies of Bracton suggests that this link between 
Bracton’s discussion of laesae maiestatis and the law of treason was not overlooked by 
common lawyers. Of the lawyers who annotated the criminal law section in Bracton, the 
majority noted the section on crimen laesae maiestatis simply as ‘treason’153. While these 
                                                 
146 As Milsom observes, any judge who changes the law ‘must be persuaded that what he is doing is 
intellectually defensible; there must be a way of  putting the matter which, on the existing authorities, is at 
least plausible’ (S.F.C. Milsom, Not Doing is No Trespass, in: Studies in the History of  the Common Law, 
London 1985, p. 103). Bracton provided the relevant authority in this field.  
147 Bracton, fo. 118v.  
148 Bracton, fo. 118v and 119v.  
149 For the significance of  this, see supra n. 135 and text.  
150 See supra, n. 95 and text.  
151 Staunford, Les Plees del Coron (supra, n. 79), fo. 2. Staunford did not make the link in his reading on 
forfeiture for treason, but he did highlight functional equivalence between the Roman lex julia maiestatis and 
the English forfeiture rules (BL MS Harg. 92, fo. 87v).  
152 Fleetwood, Certen Notes (supra, n. 72), p. 240.  
153 Bracton HEH; fo. 118v-119; SLL, sig. 2¶i and fo. 118v; ASC, fos. 99, 101, 105, 119, 141; SUL fo. 118v and 
DCC fo. 12v (marginal note of  ‘Traytor’). See also Bracton LIL1, manuscript Latin index bound at rear 
which unusually features the vernacular ‘treason’ for Bracton's discussion of  laesae maiestatis. Edward Coke's 
commonplace incorporates material from Bracton's discussion of  laesae maiestatis under the heading 'treason' 
(BL MS Harleian 6687, fo.110).  
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notes may not have been a prelude to commonplacing, the approach was based around 
that reading technique154 . The lawyers reading Bracton were compelled to place legal 
material, such as that from Bracton, into contemporary categories. In the case of the crimen 
laesae maiestatis the appropriate category was treason. If lawyers then looked for material 
on treason in their commonplace books, they would find a reference to laesae maiestatis.  
 More specific evidence can be provided. The earliest known early-modern 
common lawyers to draw links between the English law of treason and the Roman law of 
laesae maiestatis knew Bracton well. The first reference occurs in William Staunford’s 1545 
reading on forfeiture for treason, where English law was explicitly linked with the Roman 
lex Julia maiestatis155. Staunford cited Bracton in his reading and then in his Plees del Coron. 
The second reference to treason as laesae maiestatis is made in an anti-Catholic polemic 
from 1570, where ‘[h]ye treasons’ are described as ‘offences against hye maiestie, that is, 
either to the destruction of the persons, or denyall and defacement of the iust dignities 
and authorities of those that beare the name of maiestie…And therefore is treason called 
Crimen lesae maiestatis, the crime of violating or abating maiestie.’ The author of that 
polemic was Thomas Norton, the editor of the 1569 edition of Bracton156.  
 None of this demonstrates conclusively Bracton's role in changing the language 
and concept of treason in English law. However, the work of Thomas Egerton, an 
important crown legal official and judge, does do so 157 . As Lord Keeper and Lord 
Chancellor, Thomas Egerton explicitly relied upon Bracton in developing his concept of 
crimes against the commonwealth and in so doing asserted that the crime of laesae 
maiestatis was part of English law. In Bracton, the offence of laesae maiestatis included a 
reference to acts done ‘ad seditionem domini regis’ 158 . Egerton used this to draw links 
between treason and sedition, even asserting that they were the same. In 1600, Egerton 
directed the judges that sedition was treason until treason was placed on a statutory 
footing in the fourteenth century159, and in 1605, Egerton explained to the Star Chamber 
                                                 
154 Marginal notes to Bracton usually seem to be a prelude to commonplacing, but criminal law was not a 
regular feature of  commonplace books (see supra, n. 99 and text). However, if  lawyers were reading Bracton 
precisely because of  an interest in criminal law, then the relative absence of  criminal law material in 
commonplace books might not be reflected in those of  the readers of  Bracton.  
155 BL MS Harg. 92, fos. 86 and 87v.  
156 Thomas Norton, ‘A warning agaynst the dangerous practises of  Papistes, and specially the parteners of  
the late rebellion’ in: All such treatises as have been lately published by Thomas Norton, London 1570, sig. Ci-Civ.  
157 The best work on Egerton’'s career is Knafla, Law and Politics (supra, n. 7). Egerton served as solicitor 
general and attorney general for Elizabeth I (the chief  royal prosectuorial positions), then as Master of  the 
Rolls and Lord Keeper in Chancery, before being ennobled (as Baron Ellesmere) by James I and serving as 
Lord Chancellor until his death in 1616.  
158 Bracton, fo. 118v.   
159 Hatfield House Calendar of  MS Vol. 10, June 14 1600.  
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that groups seeking religious liberty sought ‘movere seditionem regni, which is treason’, and 
so these ‘maintainers and movers of sedition…deserve the greatest punishment next to 
treason’ 160 . Egerton’s personal notes show that he made such points expressly in 
association with Bracton. Some notes for the Star Chamber judgment against Oliver St 
John in 1615 show Egerton citing Bracton to demonstrate that ‘maiore seditionem’ was ‘crimen 
lese maiestatis’ at common law161 , while other undated notes concerned with the Star 
Chamber again link treason and sedition and reference both Bracton and Glanvill 162 . 
Egerton’s copy of Staunford’s Plees del Coron underlines the material concerning laesae 
maiestatis and sedition taken from both Glanvill and Bracton163. Egerton’s Bracton is not 
heavily annotated, but the section on crimen laesae maiestatis is an exception to that164, 
suggesting that Egerton, a leading Crown official and judge in the crucial period, made 
use of Bracton, via Staunford, in developing his concepts.  
 In this context Bracton did not change English law alone, rather the work 
introduced a new vocabulary into English law. This new vocabulary was already familiar 
to common lawyers from their earlier education and brought with it a new set of 
concepts165. As an example of the influence of legal ideas from one system affecting the 
development of another, it is also of wider interest. Given the Roman influence, it must 
be stressed that the use of Roman concepts here does not seem to be tied to any idea of 
a ‘reception’ of the substantive ius commune based upon the texts of Justinian’s Corpus 
Iuris166. There is no evidence of the use of texts from the ius commune in this field. The 
Roman ideas used by common lawyers came from literary and historical texts. Roman 
concepts from classical literature, mediated via Bracton, influenced common lawyers’ 
understanding of their own law. Rather than a reception of Roman law, it might be better 
to see this as a classicising of the common law.  
 
                                                 
160 Speech to the judges in the Star Chamber in: Les Reportes del Cases in Camera Stellata, 1593-1609, John 
Hawarde, ed. by W.P. Baildon, London 1894, p. 188.  
161 HEH MS El. 453.  
162 HEH MS El. 485, fo.2v. Egerton was not alone in describing both laesae maiestatis and sedition as 
treason; the same was done by the annotator of  Bracton ASC (see fo. 99, 101, 105, 119 and 141).  
163 Henry E. Huntington Library Rare Book 69586, fo. 1v.  
164 Bracton HEH, fo. 118v-119.  
165 From a comparative law perspective, this has some links with Watson’s suggestion that legal transplants 
which merely change the vocabulary in the transplanting system provide a degree of  residual influence for 
the donor legal system (A. Watson, Legal Transplants, an approach to comparative law, Edinburgh 1974, p. 97).  
166 Scrutton observes, correctly, that ‘Bracton's crimen laesae majestatis appears to derive hardly anything 
but its name from Roman law’ (T.E. Scrutton, The Influence of the Roman Law on the Law of England, 
Cambridge 1883, p. 107). The literature on receptions of Roman law is vast. Important works considering 
any reception in early-modern England include J.H. Baker, English Law and the Renaissance, Cambridge Law 
Journal, 44 (1985), p. 46-61, and Ibbetson, Common Law and Ius Commune, [Selden Society Lecture], 
London 2001.  
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The structure of the law  
Bracton’s influence was not always predictable. Thomas Norton, in his preface to Bracton, 
stressed that Bracton had brought order to the sources of English law, which were 
‘indigesta confusio’, by application of the institutional method from the civil law 167 . 
Concerns about the volume of common-law material, the importance of memory and the 
need for method to aid in retention of information were widespread in the early-modern 
common law 168 . Somewhat surprisingly, therefore, there seems to have been little 
influence from Bracton in arranging material according to the institutional model 169 . 
However, this should alert us to an important point about the utility of Bracton – Bracton 
was only used where it was considered useful to do so. The dogmatic Ramist and 
common lawyer, Abraham Fraunce, discussed method in law books and observed that 
Bracton simply followed the order of the civil law. Fraunce praised Bracton for a method 
superior to that of simply collecting common law material under alphabetical headings, 
but he certainly did not think that the structure was perfect170. Annotators to Bracton seem 
to show a preference for another mode of structuring their knowledge.  
 While common lawyers reading Bracton continued to commonplace material 
under headings, seven annotators also made use of humanist techniques with similarities 
to Ramism to divide (and sometimes sub-divide) the material in Bracton, using this 
approach to impose some structure on the law. The classically Ramist visual technique of 
bifurcation is consequently widespread amongst readers of Bracton171. Some annotators 
not only used such a visual approach, but also marked where Bracton’s text included an 
example of divisio172. Robert Callis' 1622 reading on sewers made use of Bracton in this way, 
                                                 
167 Bracton sig. 1¶ii.  
168 Ross, Memorial Culture (supra, n. 58), p. 271-295.  
169  The only arrangement of  the common law on institutional lines was the civilian John Cowell’s 
Institutiones (supra, n. 48). Coke’s Institutes do not follow the civilian method.  
170  Abraham Fraunce, The Lawiers Logike, London 1588, fos. 118v-119v. For Fraunce's Ramism, see 
Abraham Fraunce, The Arcadian Rhetorike, ed. by E. Seaton, Oxford 1950, p. ix-xvi.  
171 Such annotations are found in: Bracton NUL, fos. 1v, 2v, 443v; Bracton EUL1, fos. 3-6v; Bracton KCL, fo. 
105; Bracton SLL, sig. 2qii; Bracton ASC, passim. On Ramism, see most recently Howard Hotson, Commonplace 
Learning: Ramism and its German ramifications, 1543-1630, Oxford 2007, especially p. 44-51. For discussion of  
Ramism and the common law, see L.A. Knafla, Ramism and the English Renaissance, in: Science, Technology, 
and Culture in Historical Perspective, ed. by L.A. Knafla, M.S. Staum and T.H.E. Travers, Calgary 1976, p. 
40; I.D. Aikenhead, Students of  the Common Law 1590-1615: Lives and Ideas at the Inns of  Court, University of  
Toronto Law Journal, 27 (1977), p. 243; and W.R. Prest, The Dialectical Origins of  Finch’s Law, Cambridge Law 
Journal, 36 (1977), p. 326-352. For an example of  the Ramist visual approach applied to the common law, 
see Prest, Dialectical Origins, p. 333. Finch is unusual in applying the technique to the entire common law: 
annotators of  Bracton used the approach to analyse particular parts of  the law found in Bracton.  
172 Bracton NUL, fo. 4v, Bracton KCL, fos. 6 and 24v, and Bracton SLL, fo. 23v. As Maclean observes, Ramist 
dichotomies are a visual representation of  ‘a technique of  logical disposition found in the Digest itself ’ (I. 
Maclean, Interpretation and meaning in the Renaissance : the case of  law, Cambridge 1992, p. 38). Like civilians 
using Ramist techniques (discussed by Maclean, Interpretation and meaning, pp. 37-8), these common lawyers 
clearly took their cue to utilise dichotomies from the use of  divisio in the text of  Bracton itself.  
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relying upon Bracton's division of the topic of exile to set out the law173. The reading also 
shows a propensity to utilise the Ramist visual approach174.  
 The annotations, and Callis' reading, seem to indicate that a sizeable proportion 
of the readers to Bracton were in this regard predisposed to structuring material in a 
Ramist, rather than civilian, fashion175. Ramism was not in itself applied dogmatically, but 
the approach was applied in conjunction with other memorial techniques, principally 
commonplacing176. While the use of Ramist techniques could be attributed to Fraunce’s 
polemical encouragement of such techniques, it seems more probable that the reason 
was a combination of receptivity and utility.  
 In the later sixteenth century an increasing proportion of common lawyers had 
attended university, with the concomitant likelihood of coming into contact with 
Ramism and its claim of suitability for structuring any field of knowledge 177 . That 
educational background explains a predisposition to Ramism. Some common lawyers 
may have had familiarity with the institutional structure, even before the publication of 
Cowell’s Institutiones Iuris Angliae in 1605. Abraham Fraunce noted that Bracton’s structure 
would be familiar to readers of the Institutes, suggesting that he considered such 
familiarity a possibility178, and there is some evidence that some common lawyers turned 
to Justinian’s Institutes as an introductory text in the early-seventeenth century 179 . 
However, the institutional structure was a problematic one for common lawyers to apply, 
as many common lawyers still tended to focus on actions rather than substantive law, 
even if the gradual rise of trespass on the case writs reduced the importance of different 
writs. An institutional structure was poorly suited to such exposition, whereas a Ramist 
approach could be used successfully180. Common lawyers therefore rejected, or perhaps 
simply ignored, Bracton’s institutional structure and experimented instead with a better-
known, and more easily applicable, method for structuring their knowledge.  
                                                 
173 Callis, Reading (supra, n. 86), p. 188.  
174 Examples can be found throughout, but the best example is Callis’ summary of  his previous readings, 
Callis, Reading (supra, n. 86), pp. 220-225.  
175 If  this is correct, the use of  Ramism by Henry Finch in his Nomotechnia is less radical than it might at 
first appear.  
176 In this regard the annotators of  Bracton are similar to the writers of  method books in the common law, 
who also mixed Ramism with other techniques (Ross, Memorial Culture (supra, n. 58), p. 286 n. 199).  
177 On this ‘matriculation revolution’ at the Inns of Court, see L.A. Knafla, The Matriculation Revolution and 
Education at the Inns of Court in Renaissance England, in: Tudor Men and Institutions: Studies in English Law 
and Government, ed. by A. Slavin, Baton Rouge 1972, p. 232.   
178 Fraunce, Lawiers Logike, fo. 118v.  
179 W.R. Prest, The Inns of  Court under Elizabeth I and the early Stuarts, 1590-1640, London 1972, p. 147.  
180 In this sense Finch’s work is still important in making the transition to arranging material concerning 
substantive law, rather than focussing on the forms of  action. Although Ramist techniques were used, there 
is no evidence of  Ramist ideas influencing the substance of  the law. In this regard English law is similar to 
the ius commune (see Maclean, Interpretation and meaning (supra, n. 172), p. 206).  
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CONCLUSION 
Bracton was an author in the common law throughout the early-modern period and 
Fitzherbert’s isolated remark did not prevent that. After the printing of Bracton the role of 
the text became was strengthened, although that process had begun over a decade earlier 
with the references to Bracton in Staunford’s Plees del Coron. However, Bracton was not 
used indiscriminately by early-modern common lawyers. The text was used in a number 
of different fields, but only where early-modern lawyers considered it appropriate. 
Lawyers turned to Bracton where existing material was lacking and did not rely on the text 
unhesitatingly or uncritically.  
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APPENDIX – COPIES OF THE 1569 PRINTING  
Table 1 – Annotated Copies of the 1569 Printing  
 
Abbreviation Library Shelfmark 
AL Advocates’ Library, Edinburgh TR E.139.1 
ASC All Souls College, Oxford ASC Stack 2nd, 8:SR.114.b 
BL1 British Library 19.b.9 
BL2 British Library 507.g.14 
BL3 British Library 507.f.18 
CUL1 Cambridge University Library Peterborough A.6.23 
CUL2 Cambridge University Library Syn.4.56.1 
DCC Downing College, Cambridge 24.2.80 
EUL1 Edinburgh University Library JY 1086 
GLL Georgetown University Law Library KD 600.B.73 1569 Folio 
GUL Glasgow University Library Mu14-b.6 
HEH Henry E. Huntington Library RB 97059 
KCL King’s College London K106 B7 
LUL Leeds University Library Strong Room Engl.fol.1569 
BRA 
LIL1 Lincoln’s Inn Library ----------------------- 
LIL2 Lincoln’s Inn Library ----------------------- 
MT1 Middle Temple Library B555 (per slip) or B547 (per an 
inner sheet) 
MUL Manchester University, John 
Rylands Library 
Deansgate 8561 
NUL Newcastle University Library PI F.347-BRA 
QCL Queen’s College, Oxford Upper Library 37.E.1 
SUL Sheffield University Library RBR Q 347 (B) 
SLL Squire Law Library, University of 
Cambridge 
J.dd.9.B.12 
TCC1 Trinity College, Cambridge Gryll.1.139 
TCC2 Trinity College, Cambridge Gryll.32.181 
THL Trinity Hall, Cambridge K8.c.18 
 
Table 2 – Unannotated Copies of the 1569 Printing 
 
Abbreviation Library Reference 
Bodl Bodleian Library, Oxford N.2.13 Jur 
CCL Corpus Christi College, Cambridge  M.2.7 
CUL3 Cambridge University Library S*.3.8.C 
DUL Durham University Library Palace Green Library, Cosin 
L.2.14181 
EUL2 Edinburgh University Library JY 473 
MPI Max Planck Institut für 
Rechtsgeschichte, Frankfurt am 
Main 
Br 13 f 01 Q182 
NCL New College, Oxford  Restricted BT1.28.2 
                                                 
181 Thanks to Dr Warren Swain of  Durham University for inspecting this copy on my behalf.  
182 My thanks to Dr Kurt Lench and Dr Douglas Osler of  the Max Planck Institut for inspecting this copy 
for annotations.  
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